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Abstract 
Pennings (2000) has shown that the government can speed-up investment by 
subsidizing the potential investing firm's entry cost while taxing the future proceeds 
from the investment, so as to render the net expected value of its subsidy program 
zero. This note argues that while speeding-up the investment timing this subsidy-tax 
program also lowers the value of the firm and therefore will be rejected by it.    
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Introduction 
The literature on irreversible investment under uncertainty has shown that a firm that 
contemplates investing in a certain project might delay its investment even when the 
expected net value of the project is positive.1 The reason for that is that by entering 
the project the firm not only expends the direct entry cost, but also loses the option to 
delay this entry. Entry, therefore, only takes place when the value of the project 
exceeds the sum of the direct entry cost and the value of the delay option.  
Pennings (2000) has studied a case in which the government subsidizes the 
potential investing firm’s entry cost and, in addition, levies special taxes on the future 
rewards from this investment.2 He shows that this tax-subsidy program can indeed 
speed-up investment by lowering the threshold value of the project that is required to 
trigger entry. Furthermore, it turns out that this objective can be reached even if the 
net present value of the government’s expenditure in this program is zero. 
 Stimulating firms' investment at no expected cost to the government might 
seem at first blush as a Pareto improvement that points at some market failure taken 
care of by the government's interference. But no market failure can be detected in the 
model and we must therefore conclude that there is a hidden cost involved in this 
outcome. This cost springs from the fact that the tax-subsidy program lowers the entry 
trigger by bringing down the value of the option to delay entry - but this value, 
however, is a part of the firm’s value. Thus, stimulating investment in this manner 
lowers the value of the potential investing firm and therefore this tax-subsidy program 
can only be enforced on the firm. The purpose of this note is to establish this point. To 
do so I use Pennings’ model, and expand the analysis there by exploring the value of 
                                                 
1
 See Dixit and Pindyck (1994) for a derivation of this result and for a survey of the related literature. 
2
 These special taxes are levied only on the rewards from this particular investment. Assuming that 
these rewards are taxed anyway, as part of the regular taxes on the firms' profits, requires the additional 
assumption that the proceeds from the regular taxes on the investment do not exceed the subsidy the 
government intends to offer, creating thus a need for these additional specific taxes. 
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the firm as well as the exact means by which the subsidy-tax program speeds-up 
investment. The analysis clarifies the reason why this tax-subsidy program lowers the 
value of the firm: The program has zero value (and therefore no burden on the firm) 
only at the relatively low threshold level the government desires. However, at levels 
of project rewards that are above this threshold - the taxes exceed the subsidy because 
the taxes are proportional to the rewards whereas the subsidy is not. Thus, the 
program speeds-up entry merely because the firm is punished by taxes if it delays its 
entry as it is waiting for the rewards from the project to increase. Naturally, this 
taxation of potential rewards lowers the value of the firm. 
Incorporating some sort of a market failure in the model could indeed open the 
door to a result where the government's tax-subsidy program speeds-up investment, 
its expected cost to the government is zero and it does no harm to the firm's value. An 
example of such a market failure would be a positive externality to the investment that 
the firm could not cash in on but the government could. Another example is a credit 
market imperfection that makes the interest rate to the government lower than that 
relevant to the firm. However, the result that the existence of such failures may lead to 
a situation where such a tax-subsidy program may be beneficial to all the involved 
parties is already well known and has nothing to do with the interactions among 
uncertainty, irreversibility  and the option to delay the timing of investment. 
 
The Model 
This model is the Pennings (2000) version of McDonald and Siegel (1986). The 
analysis in this section first re-derives Pennings (2000) main results and then extracts 
from this model original results about the firm's value.  
 3 
Consider a risk-neutral firm that contemplates investing in a certain project. In 
order to do so the firm must incur the irreversible cost X. Once the firm enters the 
project it receives a stream of profits that its expected present value is denoted by V. 
Time is continuous and the discount factor relevant to the firm is denoted by r. Both X 
and r are constants. The value of the project is a stochastic process given by: 
 
(1) dV = µVdt + σVdz, 
 
where µ and σ are constants, σ > 0 and dz is the increment of the standard Wiener 
process, uncorrelated across time and at any instant satisfying: 
 
(2) E(dz) = 0,  E[(dz)2] = 1. 
 
It is also assumed that r > µ. This assumption is necessary in preventing the value of 
the investing firm to go to infinity.  
Trying to speed-up investment, the government launches a program under 
which the firm gets a fixed subsidy denoted by θ2 when it enters the project, but the 
project's proceeds are taxed at the tax rate θ1 satisfying 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ 1. Let θV denote the 
level of V that triggers the firm to enter the project and let F(V) denote the firm’s 
value given the current value of the project, V. When V < θV  the firm’s value is 
merely the expected present value of the project at the entry time: 
 
(3) F(V) = ( ) ( )[ ]{ } ( )( ) ( )[ ]2121 11 θθθθ θθ −−−=−−− −− XVeEXVeE rTrT  
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where T is the time in which the firm’s value reaches the entry threshold
 
θV  for the 
first time, given that its current value is V. In the appendix it is shown that: 
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where β is the positive root of the quadratic: 
 
0.5σ 2Y 2 + (µ - 0.5σ 2)Y – r = 0 
 
It is also shown in the appendix that β > 1. By straightforward differentiation, 
the value of θV  that maximizes F(V) is: 
 
(5) θV  = 
1
2
11 θ
θ
β
β
−
−
−
X
. 
 
 Now assume that the government wants the present value of its expenditure on 
this finance program to be zero. This means that: 
 
(6) θ2 = θ1 θV . 
 
Applying θV , as captured by (5), in (6) yields: 
 
(7) θ2 = 
1
1
1 θβ
βθ
+−
X
. 
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Applying
 
θ2, as captured by (7), in (5) yields that in this case the entry threshold is:  
 
(8) *θV = 
11 θβ
β
+−
X
, 
 
Comparing the entry threshold in this case to the entry threshold in the case where the 
government does not exercise its tax-subsidy program, i.e., the case where θ1 = θ2 = 0, 
yields that the Government's program indeed stimulates investment by lowering the 
entry threshold. This is the main result in Penning (2000). However, applying (8) and 
(7) in (4) shows that given the optimal choice of Vθ, as captured by (8), the firm’s 
value is: 
 
(9) F*(V) = ( ) ( ) βββ
β
β
θθβ V
X 1
1
1
1 11
−
− −+−
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By straightforward differentiation: 
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where the inequality sign follows from β  > 1 and 0 ≤ θ1 ≤ 1. Thus, as (8) shows, the 
government’s program indeed stimulates investment by lowering the entry threshold. 
Yet, as (10) shows, this program also lowers the firm’s value. 
Figure 1 helps understand why the program lowers the value of the firm. The 
values of θ1 and θ2 are chosen so that the tax proceeds are equal to the subsidy exactly 
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when V equals the threshold desired by the government, *θV . This means that for all 
higher levels of V the taxes levied on the firm, θ1⋅V, are larger than the subsidy, 
implying that the program lowers the net value of the project at that range. With θ1 
sufficiently high - the net value at that range is sufficiently reduced so that its present 
value is less than the value of entry at V = *θV . Thus, the program speeds-up entry 
merely because the firm is punished by taxes if it delays its entry. Naturally, this 
punishment policy has an adverse effect on the value of the firm. 
 
 
Figure 1: The thick line shows the net value of the project without the government's 
tax-subsidy program. The thin line shows the net value of the project under the 
government's tax-subsidy program. The program lowers the net value of the project 
for all V > *θV . 
   V 
V - X 
 (1 - θ1)V - (X - θ2) 
V* *
θV  
- X 
 - (X - θ2) 
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Concluding Remarks 
In this note I have shown that the tax-subsidy program for the stimuli of investment 
that was studied in Pennings (2000) lowers the value of the potentially investing firm 
and therefore has to be enforced on the firm, rather than offered to it. Thus, this 
program is close in its nature to warranting a fine on firms that delay their 
investments. An example of such a fine is the tax rate on idle urban land, which is 
higher than the tax on developed urban land.  
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Appendix 
In this appendix (4) is established. Define M(V) ≡ E(e-rT) as the present value of a 
bond the yields $1 at time T, where T is the time where V reaches the value Vθ for the 
first time, and given the current value of V. Since V is a Geometric Brownian Motion, 
then, by Ito's lemma: 
 
(a1)  dM(V) = [µVM '(V) + 0.5σ 2V 2M"(V)]dt  + σVdZ 
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The instantaneous expected capital gain on this bond must be equal to the normal 
return in the market, thus: 
 
(a2)  ( )[ ]
dt
VdME
 = µVM '(V) + 0.5σ 2V 2M"(V) = rM(V) 
 
where the first equality follows from (2) and (a1). This differential equation has a 
solution of the form VY. Applying it in the (a2) yields that Y is the root of the 
quadratic: 
 
(a3)  0.5σ 2Y 2 + (µ - 0.5σ 2)Y – r = 0 
 
Denote the two roots of this equation by α and β. Applying Y = 0 and then Y = 1 and 
using the assumption that r > µ, yields that one root of this quadratic, α, is negative 
and the other one, β, exceeds unity. These notations lead to: 
 
(a4)  M(V) = AVα + BVβ 
 
Where A and B are constants that need to be determined yet. By the properties of 
Geometric Brownian Motion, if initially V = 0 than the probability that its value shall 
ever reach Vθ is zero and therefore so is the value of the bond that yields $1 when Vθ 
is reached. This means that M(0) = 0 and since α < 0 it also leads to A = 0. If, on the 
other hand, the current value of V is already Vθ  then this bond yields $1 immediately, 
implying that M(Vθ) = 1, which leads to B = 1/Vθ β. This establishes E(e-rT) = 
β
θ






V
V
 
and therefore (4). 
